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tion model that includes the housing purchase decision is constructed and used to 
compare the behavior of typical U.S. and Japanese households. The Japanese 
household is induced to save more early in the life cycle in order to meet the 
higher down-payment requirement. However, the contribution of the induced 
early saving due to the down-payment requirement seems to be too small to 
explain a large differential in the saving rates of the two countries. The high 
economic growth of the late 1950s and 1960s in Japan is instrumental in explaining 
its high saving rate. Finally, tax reform concerning the tax deductibility of mort- 
gage interest payments or the tax-exempt status of interest income is shown to 
have a small impact on the aggregate saving rate in either country. For example, 
the introduction of tax-exempt saving in the United States would increase the 
saving rate by only 1.5%. J. Japan. Int. &on., September 1988, Z(3), pp. 215- 
238. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104, and National 
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Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; and University of Michigan, Ann 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely noted that one of the major differences between the U.S. 
and Japanese economies is found in the institutions and regulations of 
financial markets. In addition, the tax incentives for saving and borrowing 
in the two countries are quite different. Most of the interest income from 
consumer savings is tax exempt and interest payments of consumer mort- 
gages and debts are not tax deductible in Japan, while the opposite is true 
in the United States.’ Institutional arrangements concerning housing, one 
of the major expenditure items in a lifetime for most consumers, are also 
quite different in the two countries. Many economists have suggested that 
1 In Japan, interest income from the following savings (with a ceiling on principal 
amounts) was tax exempt prior to April 1, 1988: (i) regular postal saving up to 3 million yen; 
(ii) postal saving earmarked for housing purchase up to 0.5 million yen; (iii) “Maru-yu,” that 
is, any deposits in bank securities and mutual funds, up to 3 million yen; (iv) “special maru- 
yu,” that is, government and municipal bonds, new issues and secondary, up to 5 years after 
issue, up to 3 million yen; and (v) only for employees of age 54 or younger, for the purpose of 
accumulating assets for housing and retirement funds, up to 5 million yen. Thus a young 
employee who wants to save for a housing purchase can receive tax-free interest up to 14.5 
million yen ($90,625, if $1 = 160 yen). Even beyond the tax exempt ceiling, there are 
financial instruments (discount bonds issued by investment banks and governments) which 
are subject to a low ta.x rate (16%) regardless of the income tax bracket of the bondholder. 
About 58% of personal savings is in one of the above forms of tax-exempt savings (Bank of 
Japan, 1986; p.158). As of April 1,1988, tax exemptions for types (i) and (iii) are replaced by 
a 20% interest income tax. Tax-exempt “new mar-u-yu” accounts can be held by the elderly 
(65 years or older), the handicapped, or single mothers. 
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differences in housing financing between the two countries may be par- 
tially responsible for the large gap in the personal saving rate between the 
two countries. (See Hayashi (1986) for a survey of the literature.) In a 
world with perfect capital markets where a consumer can borrow and lend 
over his life cycle, whether a consumer decides to rent housing or pur- 
chase a house would not have any effect on the lifetime consumption- 
saving pattern. However, in the presence of a liquidity constraint (i.e., a 
down-payment requirement) purchasing a house may create a distortion 
in the lifetime consumption-saving decision. A higher down-payment re- 
quirement may induce households to postpone consumption early in the 
life cycle in order to build up enough assets to qualify for buying a house. 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the eflect of tax incentives and 
down-payment requirements on households” tenure choice (own or rent) 
concerning housing and on consumption-saving patterns, with a compari- 
son of the United States and Japan in mind. In particular, a life-cycle 
simulation model will be constructed to quantify the effect of these poli- 
cies on the personal saving rate. The methodology is based on that of 
Slemrod (1982), who constructed a life-cycle model with endogenous 
homeownership decisions. 2 He showed that although the favorable tax 
treatment of owner-occupied housing in the United States encourages an 
early purchase of housing, the down-payment constraint induces the con- 
sumer to delay the purchase to avoid distortion in the consumption- 
saving pattern. Thus, an optimal lifetime pattern of tenure choice of hous- 
ing is determined as a trade-off between the tax incentives and the 
required distortions in the lifetime consumption stream. 
In this paper, we apply an expanded version of the Slemrod model to a 
comparative study of the U.S. and Japanese housing markets. The model 
predicts that due to the imperfect capital market, transaction costs, and 
the relatively higher housing price, the Japanese are induced to save more 
toward the down payment and to acquire a home later in their life cycle. 
Reasonable values are substituted from the stylized facts of the two 
countries. Most parameter values in the simulation model are based on 
observed data of the U.S. and Japanese economies. Some parameter 
values are chosen so that the tenure pattern and saving rates that our 
model predicts are matched with the observed tenure pattern in each 
country. 
2 As in Slemrod’s model, land, a nonreproducible asset, is not explicitly introduced in our 
model. The value of land relative to total household wealth is much higher in Japan than in 
the United States. Morever, land has presumably appreciated more than financial wealth. 
The potentiahy important role of land in the saving process and its implications for the 
differential performances of the United States and Japan are not explored in this paper. One 
simplitkation adopted in the paper is that the model considers only the demand side of the 
asset. The supply of housing is not modeled and the general equilibrium response of prices to 
changes in policies is not included in the analysis. 
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Exercises with the simulation model are developed to show how much 
the difference in tax incentives contributes to the savings rate gap be- 
tween the two countries. It is particularly interesting to investigate how 
tax reform would affect the aggregate saving rate and housing tenure 
choice, since reforms have been implemented or proposed recently in 
both countries. On April 1, 1988, Japan abolished most of the tax exemp- 
tion for saving and replaced it with a uniform low tax rate. Furthermore, a 
tax break for the purchase of owner-occupied housing, in one form or 
another, has been proposed in Japan. In the United States, incentives for 
saving have been introduced in the form of the all-savers’ certificate and 
individual retirement accounts, although these programs have been cut 
back recently. In addition, some recent tax reform proposals, in particular 
Aat tax proposals, feature the elimination of the tax deductibility of home 
mortgage interest payments. 
In the discussion of tax reform in either country, no one has presented 
quantitative estimates showing how much the house tenure pattern and 
the saving rate would change due to the proposed reform. This paper will 
take up this task using a simulation model. 
In Section 2, we describe a life-cycle model with endogenous housing 
tenure choice which is a special case of Slemrod’s (1982) model. Sections 
3 and 4, respectively, summarize the stylized facts of the U.S. and Japa- 
nese housing markets. Section 5 presents the results of various exercises 
using the simulation model to investigate the effect of changes in the 
economic environment in both countries. Section 6 offers some conclud- 
ing remarks. 
2. A LIFE-CYCLE MODEL WITH HOUSING TENURE CHOICE 
In this section, we describe a six-period life-cycle model which will be 
used for the simulation analyses to be discussed later. Each period is 
meant to represent 10 years of a person’s adult lifetime. The household, 
which lives six periods, chooses the consumption of a composite com- 
modity and housing services for each period over the lifetime. Housing 
services may be obtained either by purchasing a house or by renting 
housing. Imperfect capital markets are assumed in that the household 
cannot borrow to finance nonhousing consumption. The household can, 
however, obtain a mortgage toward purchase of a house, provided it can 
come up with a down payment which is some fraction of the house value. 
The liquidity constraint may be binding for two reasons, First, when 
income early in the life cycle is less than income later, as will be assumed, 
consumption smoothing may become impossible. Second, if owner-occu- 
pying as opposed to renting is preferred, the household has to save in 
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order to accumulate enough wealth for the down payment. Even if the 
liquidity constraint for consumption smoothing is binding, there may be 
positive saving in order to build up the down payment. 
The desirability of owning a house comes from two sources. First, it is 
assumed that a house owned would yield services with higher utility than 
the identical house if rented. This assumption is meant to represent the 
advantage of eliminating the principal-agent relationship if one rents from 
onesew, i.e., a renter cannot alter, paint, and improve a house as desired, 
and a renter is subject to a risk of termination of lease or rent increase in 
the future. Second, in the United States, the imputed income from owner- 
occupied housing is untaxed, while interest payments are tax deductible 
and interest income from saving is taxable. This feature makes owning a 
house more attractive than renting one, unless there are offsetting tax 
advantages offered to landlords. This argument does not apply identically 
to Japan, where interest payments are not tax deductible and most of 
personal interest income is (until recently) practically tax exempt. To the 
extent that rental income is taxed, however, there is a tax-related advan- 
tage to owning housing as opposed to renting in Japan as well as in the 
United States. 
It is assumed that in the first period the household cannot purchase a 
house because of the liquidity and down-payment constraints. Likewise, 
by the beginning of the last period, the household must sell any owned 
housing and move into a rental unit, consuming all the proceeds of the 
house sale in the last period. (We abstract from the bequest motive until 
later.) Thus the household has a choice of owning a house during any of 
the second, third, fourth, and fifth periods, but can buy only once. For 
each own/rent lifetime pattern, the household can calculate the optimal 
consumption/saving pattern by maximizing the discounted sum of lifetime 
utility subject to the lifetime budget constraint and the liquidity and down- 
payment constraints. By comparing the maximized levels of lifetime util- 
ity for different patterns of tenure choice, the household picks the own/ 
rent pattern that yields the highest utility. (For simplicity, depreciation on 
a house is ignored.) 
We assume housing purchases and sales take place at the end of a 
period. When a house is purchased with a down payment d of the house 
value, the down-payment expenditure is deducted from income of the 
period of house purchase. The mortgage debt (1 - d) becomes (1 + R) 
(1 - d) at the beginning of the next period, where R is the (before tax) 
interest rate. An equal payment of V for m periods amortizes the mort- 
gage debt. (Later, m = 2 for Japan and wt = 3 for the United States will be 
chosen.) The interest portion of the mortgage repayment is tax deductible 
in the United States. Thus the “net” mortgage repayment V(m) in the 
United States is the mortgage payment less the (deductible) interest por- 
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tion of the repayment for the mth installment. When a house is sold, the 
value of the house, less remaining mortgage, is used for consumption after 
the period of the sale. 
The instantaneous utility function is assumed to be log linear in con- 
sumption and housing services (with weight 01), and lifetime utility is 
assumed to be additively separable over time. For example, suppose that 
household purchases a house at period t(6) and sells at period t(s). The 
household has to solve the following problem: Maximize with respect to 
t(b), t(s), {c(t), t = 1, . . . ,6}, {h(z), t = 1, . . . , t(b), t(s) + 1, . . , ,6}, 
H, 
t(b) w 
; pt-‘{log c(t) + QI log h(t)} + c @‘-‘(log c(t) + CK log yH)} 
t=t(b)+ I 
subject to A(O) = 0, 
A(t) = (1 + R(l - T))A(~ - 1) + y(t) - c(t) - P&,/z(t), 
t= 1,. . .,t(b)-1 
A(t) = (1 + R(1 - r))A(z - 1) + y(t) - c(t) - P,Phh(r) - dP,,H, 
t = t(b) 
A(t) = (1 + R(1 - $)A(t - 1) + y(t) - c(t) - V(m)(l - d)P,,H, 
t=t(b)+l,. . .,t(s)-1 
A(t) = (1 + R(1 - T))A(~ - 1) + y(t) - c(t) - V(m)(l - d)PhH + P,,H, 
t = t(s) 
A(t) = (1 + R(1 - T))A(~ - 1) + y(t) - c(t) - P,P,h(t), 
t=t(s)+l,. . .,6 
t-t(b) 
A(t) 2 max[O, dPhH -t c {V - (V - V(rn))/~}] 
m-l 
[liquidity constraint], t = 1, . . . , 5 
A(6) = 0 [no bequest condition], 
where y(t) and c(t) are labor income and consumption in period t, respec- 
tively; A(t) is the end-of-the-period financial asset value; h is the size of a 
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rental unit (which could vary every period); H is the size of an owner- 
occupied unit (which remains constant once purchased); R is the interest 
rate on financial assets and liabilities; P, is the price per period of a rental 
unit; Ph is the price of the owner-occupied house; y, 7, d are parameters 
representing the pride-of-ownership coefficient, the tax rate on income 
from saving and financial assets, and the required down-payment ratio, 
respectively. We define the unit of H such that Ph can be normalized to 
one. Under the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas utility function, H has a 
unit price elasticity. Therefore, the normalization does not affect the qual- 
itative results in this paper. 
There is an implicit arbitrage condition assumed between rental prop- 
erty investment and financial asset investment. P, equals R due to arbi- 
trage between the financial asset and real asset if both incomes are tax- 
able, as in the United States. P, equals R(l - P’) if interest income on 
financial assets is not taxed but rental income is taxed, as in Japan, where 
rr is the tax rate on rental income. Saving in this model is defined as the 
change in total wealth. 
The liquidity constraint implies that total borrowing must be less than 
or equal to the value of owned housing. The calculation of V(m) needs 
some explanation. For Japan, where there is no tax deductibility for inter- 
est payments, V(m) = V, and the equal installment is calculated from a 
condition that the mortgage be just paid up after the maturity of the 
mortgage. For the United States, V(m) represents the equal payments of 
mortgage less the tax rebate resulting from tax deductibility of the mort- 
gage interest payment.3 
Due to the time separability and log linearity of the utility function, 
backward induction yields an explicit solution for optimal consumption, 
(rent/own) housing service for all periods. 
3 For Japan, suppose that the mortgage matures in two periods (20 years). The condition 
of equal payments is (1 + R){(l - d)(l + R) - V} - V = 0. Solving this, we have 
V(m) = V = (1 - d)(l + R)*l(2 + R), m = 1,2; 
V(m) = 0, m=3,. . . , 
In addition, interest income from saving is tax exempt, i.e., T = 0. For the United States, 
suppose that the mortgage matures in three periods (30 years). The condition of equal 
payments is (1 f R)[(l -t R){(I - &(I + R) - V} - V = 0. Solving this, we have V = (I - 
dW I + R)Y{ I + (1 + R) + (1 + R)*}. In the period of first installment, the interest portion of 
the mortgage payment is (I - d)R. Therefore multiplying the tax rate 7, we obtain the 
amount af tax saving, ~(1 - d)R. The “net” mortgage payment is defined as V(1) = V - (1 - 
~)RT. Since the principal balance is shrinking as the installment continues, the interest 
portion of the installment changes. Accordingly the net mortgage payment in the mth instail- 
ment is calculated as 
V(2) = V - {(l - d)( I + R) - V}Rr 
V(3) = V - [(I + RX(l - d)( 1 + R) - V} - VIRT. 
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One extension of the model that we will consider is to include a bequest 
motive. In particular, we require that housing of value q be left as a 
bequest. Assuming that the heirs are 30 years younger than the parents, 
the bequest is equally divided among the heirs who are at the end of their 
third period of life. Because population is larger and the lifetime income is 
higher for later generations, the size of the house per heir has to be 
adjusted accordingly, so that 
qh = d{((l + n)(l + $?>>3), 
where q is the benefactor’s house size, qh is the heir’s house size obtained 
at the end of the third period, n is the population growth rate, and g is the 
(generational) income growth rate. 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET 
Data for mortgage financing with a government guarantee are available 
from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
In 1979, the average ratio of mortgage value to the value of a new one- 
family house whose finance was government guaranteed was 0.921. This 
ratio seems very high, partly due to a sample bias of government guaran- 
tees. The average loan-to-value ratio, 1 - d, of conventional mortgage 
financing, according to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1982), for a 
new home was 0.731 in 1980 and 0.748 in 1981. Based on these data, our 
first stylized fact is that the down-payment ratio is about 25 to 30% for 
conventional mortgages and only about 10% for housing with govem- 
ment loan guarantees. We select 25% as a benchmark of the U.S. down- 
payment ratio. 
Second, the average age of mortgagor was about 30 for an owner- 
occupant transaction in 1980, according to the “FHA Trends of Home 
Mortgage Characteristics.” Another source, the “Annual Housing Sur- 
vey, ” confirms that among the cohort of household heads, 25-30 years 
old, more than 50% own a house rather than rent. 
Third, the average maturity of a mortgage is about 30 years, according 
to HUD (1979, p. 295). Fourth, the house-value/annual-income ratio, 
&H/y(6), is 1.97 for a typical transaction of one-family housing, accord- 
ing to HUD (1979, p. 134). Last, the life-cycle income pattern of the U.S. 
household is calculated by multiplying the average income for an age 
bracket by the labor participation rate in 1980. (Source: U.S. Department 
of Commerce, 1981; Department of Labor, 1985..) As a proportion of the 
average income of those 20-30 years old, the incomes of the six age 
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brackets we are interested in are calculated as follows, after normalizing 
so that y( 1) + y(2) + . . . + y(6) = 1: 
YXl) = 0.169; YX2) = 0.248; ~~(3) = 0.257; 
y,(4) = 0.218; y,(5) = 0.108; y,(6) = O.O(KJ. 
Since this income pattern with respect to age bracket is an observation 
at a point of time t, the lifetime pattern of a generation must be estimated 
in order to be used in the life-cycle maximization problem of one particu- 
lar generation. In the steady state, this can be done by multiplying by the 
growth rate of (real) lifetime income over a generation. We assume that 
members of a generation receive (1 + g) as much income in every age 
bracket as members of a generation earlier so that 
Yt+sW = (1 + g)Sy,(M, k = 1, 2, . . . , 6. 
The decade population (of those 15 years old and over) growth rate, II, 
is calculated as 20.04%, the rate observed from 1970 to 1980. The decade 
income growth rate over one generation (10 years apart), g, is fixed 
at 1O%.4 
4. STYLIZED FACTS IN THE HOUSING MARKETS IN JAPAN 
4.1 Loans us Self-Financing5 
The ratio of down payment (literally translated as a ratio of self-financ- 
ing) is defined as the ratio of the average amount the owner of a new home 
raised to the average cost of construction or purchase of the home. In the 
198Os, the ratio of down payment has been about 40% for both custom- 
made homes and homes purchased from developers. The rest, about 60% 
of purchase costs, comes from subsidized and privately financed loans. 
However, there are two problems with using these figures. First, 
“down payment” in the Japanese survey is literally defined as “the por- 
tion of self-financing,” including the owner’s savings, gifts to the owner, 
4 There are various ways to approximate-the decade income growth, depending on which 
income measures and which deflator is used. For example, the per capita real GNF.growth 
over the past 10 years less the population growth rate is about 10% of that of the United 
States. 
5 The facts are summarized from the survey study of the Ministry of Construction in 
Japan, conducted annually since 1974. (See Ministry of Construction, 1986.) The survey of 
1985 covered about 10,000 individuals who ordered custom-made homes or bought homes 
from developers. 
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and sales of other real assets. “Loans” in the survey refer to funds other 
than the owner’s. If a new owner borrows without collateral some amount 
of money from his parents and applies it toward the “down payment” to 
the developer, the amount of money would still be counted as “loans” 
instead of “down payment.” The ratio of “down payment” may there- 
fore be biased downward. Although the exact division between “self- 
finance” and “loans” may not be comparable to the division into “down 
payment” and “mortgages” in the United States, this is the closest ap- 
proximation possible and the direction of possible bias would not weaken 
our argument. * 
Second, the ratio of 40% is inclusive of second-time buyers who have 
trade-ins. If we take the down-payment ratio of the first-time buyers only, 
the down-payment ratio is about 35%. In light of these facts, a plausible 
average for the down-payment ratio for the first-time buyer is about 35%. 
This is our firsst stylized fact for the Japanese housing market. 
4.2. Average Age of New Owners 
The average age of the heads of households who built custom-made 
houses in 1985 is about 43.9. However, if only first-time buyers are sur- 
veyed, the average age is about 40. 
This evidence is not quite sufficient for the purpose of our study of an 
own/rent tenure choice in the life-cycle context. Although it shows a 
distribution of ages of purchasers, it does not show in the cross section 
how many of the cohorts have previously owned houses. In order to 
overcome the difficulty, we consulted a source of representative cross- 
sectional data in Japan, the “Family Saving Survey” collected by the 
Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister’s Office. The survey shows that 
the house ownership ratio (among the cohort) increases monotonically up 
to the age of 65. At the age of 65, 86.7% of heads of households own 
housing. It is between the ages of 35 and 39 when the majority of the 
cohort become homeowners. The ownership rate increases rapidly be- 
tween the ages of 30 and 40. From this we derive only the second stylized 
fact: In Japan, the average age of initial home purchase is about 40. 
However, looking at the percentage of households holding liabilities for 
purchase of houses and/or land, we note that less than 40% of households 
hold such liabilities. Investigating other statistics, we can conclude that 
more than one-third of house owners have no liabilities connected to 
housing. This is supporting evidence that liabilities due to home/land 
purchases are rather quickly paid up. 
4.3. Japanese Idiosyncrasies: Extended Families 
Care must be taken in comparing the Japanese housing market with its 
U.S. counterpart, in light of the prevalence of extended families. It is still 
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common in Japan for young adults between the age of 18 and the time of 
marriage to live with their parents, if they live in the same town. The 
prevalence of this arrangement is partly due to the high relative cost of 
housing, both rental and owner-occupied, and partly due to social cus- 
toms. 
Even after their marriage, it is not uncommon for children to continue 
to live with their parents. This phenomenon appears in the above-men- 
tioned survey concerning the question of what kind of housing the new 
owner had before. About 13% of owner construction and 6% of buyers 
used to “live together (with family).” This is a significant proportion, 
because as mentioned earlier the survey includes replacement and im- 
provement demand for homes. 
It is common in Japan that when parents become very old, or especially 
when one of them dies, the surviving parents are “looked after” by one of 
the children. A parent (or parents) might move into a house of one of the 
children, usually the eldest son; or the family of a child might move into 
the parents’ house. In the former case, they lose the “head of household” 
status and become dependents in the household survey, thus dropping out 
of statistics using a classification by the age of head of households. In the 
latter case, in “return” for taking care of parents, it is usual, though not 
legally required, that the child who looks after the parents inherits the 
parent’s home. (This is an extreme form of “strategic bequests,” as advo- 
cated by Bernheim et al. (1985)) The parent(s) usually remains as the 
legal owner of the house. One reason for this arrangement is that for real 
estate, as opposed to financial securities, the inheritance tax is reduced 
since the assessed value for the inheritance tax is usually significantly less 
than the market value. In either case, it is rare that the elderly sell the 
home in order to move into a rental unit. These social and economic 
aspects of Japan partly explain why the ratio of homeowners among those 
65 years old and over, among “heads of households,” does not (seem to) 
decline. 
To repeat, the second case implies that a typical Japanese family keeps 
an owner-occupied house, or even buys a new, larger home, after retire- 
ment. This is very much in contrast to the typical U.S. household that 
sells a big house after the children become adults. This aspect might not 
be adequately dealt with in a model based on the standard life-cycle 
theory, in particular Slemrod’s life-cycle model of tenure choice. 
Careful consideration of the bias caused by extended families in our 
study must be given. As for the effect of the living-in arrangement after 
the parents become old, there are two conflicting effects on the validity of 
our study. If the first case (parents moving into their children’s home) is 
dominant, we do not have to worry about the comparability of the two 
countries, since an apparently high ownership ratio among the retired 
household heads is caused by selection bias (upward). In other words, in 
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reality as opposed to the data, many sell their houses and live with a son’s 
family or a daughter’s family. Thus, the life-cycle framework of own/rent 
tenure choice still applies. However, if the second case (a son’s or daugh- 
ter’s family moving into the parents’ home) is dominant, then a bequest 
motive should be seriously modeled, and it may be the case that we have 
to argue that the difference in saving and houseownership between the 
United States and Japan is due to the extended family practice and a 
peculiar bequest motive in Japan. (See Hayashi (1986) for the extended 
family explanation of why the Japanese saving rate is so high.) Since we 
wiI1 not analyze the bequest motive in depth, we are implicitly assuming 
the second aspect of extended family relationship to be relatively insignifi- 
cant. Further theoretical and empirical analysis is required to investigate 
how much the Japanese extended family relationship would affect hous- 
ing tenure choice and saving decisions. 
4.4. Life-Cycle Labor Income Pattern and Price of Housing 
We need the life-cycle labor income pattern for the typical Japanese 
household for our simulation model. The method of calculation is the 
same as that used for the United States. The result is given in Hayashi 
(1986, Table 3): 
yr(l) = 0.09; yt(2) = 0.22; y,(3) = 0.28; 
y,(4) = 0.29; y,(5) = 0.13; y,(6) = 0.00. 
The above number is the cross-section observation at time t of the 
income pattern with respect to age brackets. As was discussed in the 
preceding section, the income pattern of a particular generation also de- 
pends on the growth rate of labor income over generations. The decade 
income growth rate, g, is approximated at 40%.6 The population (age 15 
and over) growth rate, 12, is approximated at 13.05%. 
Last, in Japan, about a third of the price of housing services can be 
traced to land, which is scarce and expensive. The average housing-value/ 
annual-income ratio, &H/y(6), for buyers of a house with land (excluding 
those who rent land and who are given land by family and relatives), 
constructed from a survey done by Ministry of Construction (1982, p. 82), 
was 5.29. 
6 Again, the income growth rate can be approximated in several ways. For example, the 
growth rate of household disposable income less the CPI growth rate less the population (age 
15 and over) growth rate from 1970 and 1980 would yield about 41%, while the per capita real 
GNP growth rate is about 40%. 
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5. SIMULATIONS 
5.1. Benchmark 
In this section, the model presented in Section 2 is used as a simulation 
model with relevant parameter values derived from the observed facts 
summarized in Sections 3 and 4. Those parameters for a typical resident 
in each country are summarized in Table I. 
First, we calcuiate the optimum housing tenure choice predicted by our 
simulation model. Given a rent-own pattern of housing for six periods, 
maximum lifetime utility is calculated by solving a dynamic problem of 
consumption (size of housing and consumption goods) and saving. The 
model then compares the maximized values of lifetime utility to decide 
the optimal pattern of tenure choice. 
The model, as summarized for the benchmark case in Table II, predicts 
that the representative Japanese resident rents in periods 1,2, and 6 of his 
life, and that the representative U.S. resident rents in periods 1 and 6 
only. That is, the typical Japanese purchases a house when he is 40 years 




P,H/y(b) R T’ 7 d 
Mortgage Aggregate 
maturity saving 





0.195 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.25 30 8.0 ROOOO? 
0.529 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.35 20 18.29 RROOO? 
Stylized facts: Cross-section income pattern at period I 
YXV Y,(2) Y,(3) Y,(4) Y,(5) Y,(6) g n 
U.S. 0.169 0.248 0.257 0.218 0.108 0.000 0.10 0.20 
Japan 0.090 0.220 0.280 0.290 0.130 o.ooo 0.40 0.13 
Benchmark parameter values: Assumptions 
cc P p, Y 
U.S. 0.15 0.75 R 1.4 
Japan 0.15 0.75 A(1 - 7’) 1.4 
a 7’ is the tax rate on rental income; 7 is the tax rate on savings on financial assets; R is the 
interest rate; d is the down-payment ratio. 
b R = rent; 0 = own. 
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TABLE II 
BENCHMARK U.S.-JAPAN COMPARISON 
Benchmark theoretical prediction Facts’ 
Tenure pattern R 0 0 0 
Labor income profile” 0.169 0.273 0.311 0.290 
Aggregate saving rate (%) 8.81 
Wealthlincomeb 2.70 
Housing/wealthC 0.74 
House size 0.078 
Tenure pattern R R 0 0 
Labor income profile 0.090 0.308 0.549 0.7% 
Aggregate saving rate (%) 10.49 
Wealth/income 2.85 
Housing/wealth 0.61 
House size 0.11 
Tenure pattern R R 0 0 
Labor income profile 0.090 0.308 0.549 0.7% 
Aggregate saving rate (%) 11.26 
Wealth/income 3.06 
Housing/wealth 0.52 
House size (purchased) 0.08 
House size (inherited) 0.03 
U.S., no bequest (q = 0) 
Japan, no bequest (q = 0) 
Japan, with bequest (q = 0.11) 












a The labor income and saving rate profile is a lifetime labor income stream of a typical 
agent in the model. The profiles are calculated as longitudinal predictions, while the aggre- 
gate saving rate is a cross-section prediction. 
b Wealth is the sum of financial assets and housing equity (value minus outstanding mort- 
gage). Income is measured on an annual basis. 
c The value of land is not included in either housing or wealth. The observed ratio of the 
value of the housing/wealth ratio is indeed higher in the United States than in Japan, as 
suggested by this simulation table. However, the value of land is much higher in Japan than 
in the United States. See also footnote 2 in the text. 
when he is 30 years old with a 30-year mortgage. These predicted patterns 
match the stylized facts summarized in previous sections. 
The saving rate predicted by the model is 8.81% for the United States 
and 10.49% for Japan. Hayashi (1986) calculates private saving rates for 
the two countries after correcting for the difference in statistical defini- 
tions. According to Hayashi’s estimates, the average private saving rates 
for the United States and Japan during the 1970s were 8.0 and I&3%, 
respectively. Thus the prediction for the United States is quite reflective 
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of the stylized fact but the prediction for Japan falls short of the actual 
rate by 8 percentage points. 
The model also shows that the housing stock share in national wealth is 
much lower in Japan than in the United States despite the high saving 
rate. We will investigate factors that contribute to the low housing stock 
in Japan by simulation experiments later. 
The model over-predicts the housing size for the United States, while it 
underpredicts the housing size for Japan. The discrepancy might be a 
signal that our utility function is misspecfied. However, without the 
Cobb-Douglas assumption, the explicit form of solution is hard to obtain. 
In the rest of this section, simulations with respect to the bequest 
motive, down-payment ratio, and the income growth rate will be con- 
ducted to evaluate the impact of changes in the financial institutions and 
economic environment on the housing market.7 
5.2. Bequest Motive in Japan 
Qne reason that the benchmark simulation under-predicts the Japanese 
saving rate is its failure to consider the bequest motive.* If the oldest 
generation does not consume all its wealth, especially the proceeds from 
the house sale which becomes available at the beginning of the last period 
of the life cycle, then the aggregate saving rate would increase. 
Without a bequest motive, the assumption that the individual sells the 
house at the beginning of the sixth period is not critical. However, with a 
bequest motive, the assumption becomes problematic. In Japan houses 
are often used as a vehicle for making a bequest, partly because of the tax 
advantage of bequeathing housing relative to financial assets.9 
How large a bequest motive is required to generate a saving rate com- 
parable to the actual rate? Table II (the third panel) shows the saving rate 
that results when the representative individual is required to bequeath 
housing of 0.2, the house size which would be owned without a bequest 
motive (i.e., the benchmark case). The experiment is conducted on the 
7 We also investigated how robust the benchmark result is with respect to the pride-of- 
ownership parameter, about which we do not have strong confidence. The tenure choice 
pattern and the saving rate predicted by the model were found to be not sensitive with 
respect to this parameter for either country. 
s One of the reasons that the bequest motive is more important in Japan is the popularity 
of the extended family relationship. If parents expect to live with (and/or to be taken care of 
by) children, they might leave bequests in return. 
9 It is well known in Japan that the assessed value of real estate for inheritance is about 
one-half or one-third of the market value, while financial assets are assessed at the full 
market value. Therefore, a rational agent who plans to bequeath should do so in the form of 
real assets, ceteris paribus. This tax treatment works against dissaving of housing among the 
elderly in Japan. 
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assumption that the household may purchase additional housing (add 
rooms) to supplement the bequest, and that the housing is held through 
the last period of life. In addition, the house is assumed to be bequeathed 
without debt against it. 
The calculated saving rate with the bequest assumption of house size 
0.2 is 11.18%. Hence, the bequest motive increases the aggregate saving 
rate by 0.7 percentage point. Modeling this type of bequest does increase 
the aggregate saving rate, but the magnitude of the increase is small 
compared to the U.S.-Japan gap. This is because adding the bequest 
motive has two offsetting effects on saving. On the one hand, the person 
is not presumed to consume the proceeds of the house sale at the end of 
the fifth period. This increases the aggregate saving rate. On the other 
hand, when a housing bequest is expected in the third period, less saving 
is the first and second periods for the down payment is required. 
In order to assess the sensitivity of the saving rate to the housing be- 
quest, experiments with different size of housing bequest were con- 
ducted. A bequest house size of 0.054 yields an aggregate saving rate of 
9.88%, while a bequest house size of 0.163 yields an aggregate saving rate 
of 12.60%. These simulation exercises suggest that the saving rate is 
somewhat sensitive with respect to this form of bequest motive, but can- 
not generate large changes in saving. 
5.3. Nun-steady State 
One of the key assumptions in the benchmark case is that the economy 
is in a steady state. The growth rates of population and real income and a 
(normalized) labor-income profile were assumed to have stayed the same 
for all generations. This assumption is particularly troublesome in the 
case of Japan. Economic growth in Japan from 1950 to 1973 averaged 
around 10% a year, about twice as much as the growth rate assumed for 
the Japanese benchmark in the preceding section. It is well known that in 
a standard life-cycle model where the young are savers, a higher growth 
rate implies a higher saving rate. This is because the older generation of 
dissavers has a much smaller “economic weight” than the younger gener- 
ation of savers. Even if the rate of trend growth is halved as it was in 
Japan after the first oil crisis, the economic weight of older generations is 
very small due to rapid economic growth in the past. Hence, it is not 
surprising that the benchmark model underpredicted the actual saving 
rate. 
We then simulate the life-cycle saving-consumption pattern for each 
generation using the actual (time-varying) economic growth rates in the 
past and the benchmark rate for the future. The income pattern for each 
generation is calculated using the actual lo-year economic growth rate 
and the cross-section age-income profile at 1980. The interest rate is 
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assumed to be contant over time. For example, a generation born in 1920 
is assumed to have had perfect foresight, and to have known the life-cycle 
income path from 1920 to 1980. (We, however, are assuming the house- 
tenure decision to be RROOOR in this exercise.) The same procedure is 
applied to other generations. The aggregate saving rates at year t, t = 
1980, . . . ,2030, are calculated by aggregating the income and saving for 
different generations, who are at the different stages of the life cycle with 
time-varying income growth rates. We use the actual population weights 
of different generations for the past and the projected population weights 
for the future. 
Table III shows the simulated Japanese saving rate from 1980 to 2030. 
In 1980, the rate is 16.12, significantly higher than that of the (steady- 
state) benchmark case and approaching the actual saving rate of 18.29. 
This is as expected due to rapid economic growth in the 1950s and l%Os, 
which implies that those who are dissaving have a small weight in the 
Japanese economy of 1980. The assumption of steady economic growth 
TABLE III 
SIMULATED JAPANESE SAVING RATE, 1980-2030, IN NON-STEADY STATE 
1980 1990 2ooo 2010 2020 2030 
Actual saving rate 18.29 na na 
lE6 8?9 Projected saving rate 16.12 14.97 15.03 
Wealth/income 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.7 3.7 
Housing/wealth 0.73 0.67 0.53 0.45 0.47 
Assumed parameters: Economic growth rates (%) for each decade 
1900-1910: 27.03 1940-1950: -29.23 
1910-1920: 44.44 1950-1960: 130.67 
1920-1930: 22.94 1960-1970: 170.99 







20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 
1960 .212 .252 .206 .161 .106 .O63 
1970 .286 .241 .192 .134 .097 .O49 
1980 .298 .245 .178 .142 .092 .045 
1990 .I94 .194 .225 .181 .133 .072 
2000 .195 .181 ,177 .201 .I53 .093 
2010 .177 .192 .175 .167 .178 .112 
2020 .177 .178 .189 .169 .152 .I34 
Source. Various years of Census and “Projection of the Japanese Population” by Jinkou 
Mondai Kenkyuukai. 
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from 1980 on assures that the aggregate saving rate converges to the 
stead-state benchmark in the future. Our simulation shows that the saving 
rate will drop by 1 (percentage) point in 10 years, 3 points in 30 years, and 
8 points in 40 years. The simulated Japanese saving rate will become very 
much like the American one in a half-century. 
We conclude this section with three observations. First, with a non- 
steady-state assumption, the simulated saving rate is much higher than 
the benchmark. However, the model still under-predicts the actual saving 
rate. Second, the saving rate is projected to decline in the future as the 
lower growth rate persists. These results are consistent with the theoreti- 
cal prediction that the saving rate is very sensitive to the economic growth 
rate. 
5.4. Simulations with Respect to Down-Payment Ratios 
We next investigate how much difference the down-payment constraint 
makes in the housing tenure choice and the saving rate. Of course, the 
higher the down-payment ratio, the more distortion in the lifetime con- 
sumption pattern required to finance the same amount of owned housing. 
Table IV shows how sensitive the housing tenure pattern is with respect 
TABLE IV 
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN DOWN-PAYMENT RATIO 
Down-payment ratio 





United States, no bequest 
ROOOOR ROOOOR ROOOOR 
8.29 9.03 9.22 
3.4 2.7 2.8 
0.91 0.70 0.66 
Japan, no bequest 
RROOOR RROOOR RROOOR RROOOR 
9.37 9.98 10.25 
2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 
0.76 0.67 0.64 
q 10.49 
0.61 









T RROOOR RROOOR RROOOR RROOOR 
S(%) 14.30 15.03 15.44 16.44 
WI1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 
H/W 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.72 
Note, Cases highlighted in boxes represent the stylized values of the down-payment ratio 
in each country. 
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to changes in the down-payment ratio. The U.S. housing tenure pattern 
would look like Japan’s (housing purchase postponed until the third pe- 
riod) if the down-payment requirement were raised to 40%. In Japan, the 
tenure pattern currently observed in the United States would not emerge 
even at a down-payment ratio of 15%. Therefore, although a change in the 
down-payment ratio could alter the tenure choice pattern, the change 
would have to be very large. The observed tenure pattern in each country 
is predicted for a wide range of the down-payment ratios around the 
respective benchmark cases. 
Table IV also shows that the aggregate saving rate is positively related 
to the down-payment ratio. An increase of 10% in the down-payment ratio 
increases the saving rate by less than 1 percentage point in each country, 
given that the tenure choice pattern is not altered. The magnitude of the 
down-payment ratio effect is not as large as one might think, because 
there are two offsetting impacts from a higher down-payment ratio. First, 
higher saving is required for a given size of house. Second, a higher down- 
payment ratio causes a smaller house to be purchased given the tenure 
choice pattern. The simulation results show that the first effect is only 
barely dominant. 
Table IV also shows how the relative share of housing in national 
wealth would be affected if the down-payment ratio were changed. When 
the down-payment ratio in Japan becomes as low as 15% the housing 
share in national wealth becomes comparable to that in the United States. 
In sum, this model suggests that the difference in the required down- 
payment ratios in the United States and Japan is not a major source of the 
difference in the saving rate. However, a large enough decline in the 
required down-payment ratio in Japan would induce a saving rate and life- 
cycle tenure pattern similar to those of the United States. In Japan, casual 
evidence suggests that the down-payment ratio was higher in the 1950s 
and 196Os, so that it could have been a stronger factor for a high saving 
rate in the past. 
5.5. Simulations with Respect to the Income Growth Rate 
First, note that the benchmark model is constructed in such a way that 
the slope of the earning profile for one generation is positively related to 
the expected income growth over generations, This feature comes from 
the fact that the observed cross-section data must be converted into a 
steady-state lifetime earning profile. Thus, in the following experiments 
using the steady state, faster growth implies a steeper earning profile. 
Results of the sensitivity analysis with respect to the income growth 
rate are summarized as follows. It is well known that the aggregate saving 
rate increases, if the steady-state growth rate of labor income over gener- 
ations increases so long as the younger generations are the savers. This is 
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confirmed in our simulation model.‘0 In fact, if the Japanese growth rate is 
only lo%, the growth rate of the United States, then the predicted steady- 
state Japanese saving rate (without a bequest motive) would be 6.62%, 
which is even below the current U.S. saving rate simulated in the model. 
The tenure choice of the Japanese case is not affected by the change in the 
income growth rate. 
However, in the United States the renting period is extended by 10 
more years if income grows at the Japanese rate, i.e., the age earning 
profile becomes steeper. The steeper earning profile implies that the util- 
ity penalty imposed by the distortion caused by saving toward down 
payments becomes more burdensome. The saving rate is increased to 
8.67%, which is far short of the actual and less even than the simulated 
Japanese saving rate. 
5.6. Simulations of Tax Reforms 
Our final simulation experiments concern changes in the tax laws which 
determine incentives for saving and borrowing. As was discussed in the 
Introduction, the tax incentives affecting saving and borrowing in the two 
countries are quite different. 
The United States and Japan (prior to the change on April 1,1988) differ 
in two aspects: the tax exemption of the interest income from saving in 
Japan only and the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments in the 
United States only. For each aspect, the simulation will be conducted for 
hypothetical situations given all other parameters. 
Our model gives simulation results, shown in Table V, for a full range of 
interesting policy questions both in the United States and in Japan: How 
much would the U.S. low saving rate be stimulated if interest income 
becomes tax exempt? How would tenure choice and average housing size 
be affected if mortgage payments become nondeductible? What are the 
combined effects of tax-exempt saving and the nondeductible interest 
payments? The last question can be paraphrased as follows. If the United 
States switched to the Japanese tax system, what would happen to the 
saving rate and housing tenure pattern? 
The effect of allowing tax-exempt saving in the United States is shown 
in the (Yes-Yes) column in Table V. The simulated aggregate saving rate 
increases by 1.5%, without changing the tenure choice pattern. The in- 
crease is not insignificant, if one is interested in raising the saving rate. 
I0 However, Hayashi (1986) obtained an opposite result in a model where there is no 
liquidity or down-payment constraint. This is due to the fact that the steep labor income 
profile causes the very young to be borrowers. 
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TABLE V 
EFFECTS OF TAX REFORMS ON THE SAVING RATE 
235 
U.S. : Using U. S . parameters and income profiles 
Tax treatment 
No. 1 No. 2 
(Japan”) 
No. 3 
(U.S. status quo) 
No. 4 
Interest income tax 
exempt? Yes Yes No 
Interest payments tax 
deductible? Yes No Yes 
Tenure choice ROOOOR ROOOOR ROOOOR 
Aggregate saving (%) 10.27 9.94 8.81 
Japan: No bequest, steady state, using Japanese parameters 





No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 
(Japan status quo*) (U.S.) 
Interest income tax 
exempt? Yes Yes No No 
Interest payments tax 
deductible? Yes No Yes No 
Tenure choice RROOOR RROOOR RRROOR RRROOR 
Aggregate saving (%) 10.83 10.49 7.01 6.98 
Japan: No bequest, non-steady state, 1980, using Japanese parameters 
and income profiles 
Interest income tax 
exempt? 
Interest payments tax 
deductible? 
Tenure choice 
Aggregate saving (%) 
No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 
(Japan status quo”) (U.S.) 
Yes Yes No No 
Yes No Yes No 
RROOOR RROOOR RRROOR RRROOR 
16.51 16.12 9.86 9.84 
n Prior to April 1, 1988. 
However, even with an increase of 1 S%, the gap in the saving rates of the 
two countries would remain large. * 1 
I’ Note that the model is not general equilibrium in nature, so that the interest rate is held 
constant when tax policy and the capital stock are changed. Introducing general equilibrium 
considerations would presumably dampen the predicted changes in the saving rate. 
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Suppose next that mortgage interest payments become not tax deducti- 
ble in the United States. This is the case indicated by (No-No) in Table V. 
The model predicts that the saving rate would be reduced by a small 
amount, less than 0.5%. This result contrasts with the usual presumption 
that the tax deductibihty of interest payments reduces the saving rate 
because it makes the cost of borrowing less. However, since buying a 
house does not represent dissaving (rather a change in portfolio) the ag- 
gregate saving rate in fact decreases when the cost of borrowing to buy a 
house rises, due to the decreased saving required to purchase the now- 
optimal smaller house. l2 
Suppose that the United States switched to the (former) Japanese tax 
system so that interest income is tax exempt and mortgage interest pay- 
ments are not tax deductible. In this case the model predicts that the 
saving rate would increase by 1 percentage point. 
Simulation experiments are then conducted for the Japanese case in 
order to answer questions symmetric to the U.S. experiments: How much 
would the high Japanese saving rate be reduced if the tax-exempt saving 
system is abolished? Would the typical Japanese tenure choice pattern be 
affected by the favorable tax treatment on mortgage payments, as in the 
United States? What would be the combined effect, i.e., if Japan switched 
to the U.S. tax system? 
The first question is quite relevant since the Japanese government has 
just abolished the tax-exempt status of the “maru-yu” accounts. The 
second question is also relevant, since adopting a more favorable tax 
treatment of mortgage payments is always proposed when housing prob- 
lems are discussed in Japan. The presumption is that the housing stock is 
one area where Japan lags behind the United States. 
The model predicts that abolition of the “mar-u-yu” accounts in Japan 
causes a drop in the steady-state saving rate by 3 to 4 percentage points. 
The housing tenure pattern would also change, so that the Japanese would 
rent 10 more years before purchasing a house. The large change in the 
saving rate comes from the change in tenure pattern. Since a house is not 
owned until the beginning of the fourth period, the distortion in saving for 
the down-payment in the first half of the working life becomes much less. 
If Japan were to introduce tax deductibility of mortgage interest pay- 
ments, then the model predicts a very slight increase in the aggregate 
l2 Remember that a liquidity constraint equivalent to a ban on borrowing in excess of 
housing capital is imposed in the model. Therefore, tax incentives for borrowing will not 
increase the demand for the composite consumption good during the first period, when the 
liquidity constraint is binding. If our focus is shifted from the down-payment constraint ta 
borrowing constraints for consumption, we would investigate the effect of eliminating the 
tax deductibility of interest payments on consumer loans. In this case elimination could raise 
the saving rate. 
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saving rate, without changing the tenure choice pattern. If Japan adopts 
the U.S. tax system with respect to interest income and interest pay- 
ments, then the model predicts a drop in the saving rate of 3.5 percentage 
points. 
The third panel of Table V shows what the non-steady-state aggregate 
saving rate would be if the hypothetical tax regime had been in place 
during the postwar period. In 1980, the saving rate would have been lower 
by 6 percentage points had the “mmaru-yu” not been available. 
The tax-exempt status of interest income has a stronger impact on the 
saving rate than the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments in 
both countries. The latter does not change the aggregate saving rate more 
than 50 basis points in any case in either country. Simulation results 
indicate that differences in the tax incentives between the two countries 
explain only 3 to 4 percentage points of the gap of 10 percentage points 
between the saving rates of the two countries. 
6. CONCLUDINGREMARKS 
We constructed a simulation model in order to evaluate the effects of 
changes in housing finance institutions and tax policy on housing tenure 
patterns and the aggregate private saving rate. Simulation results suggest 
that the factors do not offer a complete explanation of the large gap 
between the saving rates of the two countries. There are two reasons 
behind this conclusion. First, although the typical down-payment ratio 
varies across the two countries, the variation is not sufficient to affect the 
aggregate saving rate by a significant amount. Second, tax reform experi- 
ments indicate that only 1 to 4 percentage points of the lo-point gap are 
attributable to the difference in the tax incentives. 
The model, in particular the one with non-steady-state assumptions, 
suggests that the difference in the income growth rate over generations 
can explain a greater amount of the saving rate gap. Given the difference 
in the income growth rates, we suspect also that the Japanese have a 
stronger bequest motive, perhaps due to their extended family relation- 
ships. Finally, our simulations suggest that the Japanese saving rate will 
drop significantly in the long run, as the economy moves to a new low- 
growth steady state that subjects interest income to taxation. 
As is true for all numerical simulation analyses, the quantitative results 
presented here depend on our choices concerning the specification of the 
model. Several aspects of this specification are especially worthy of note. 
The use of a log-linear utility function implies an intertemporal and intra- 
temporal elasticity of substitution equal to one. This is likely to overstate 
the actual degree of substitutability, and thus understate the welfare cost 
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of a given distortion in saving/consumption patterns. For example, with 
less intertemporal substitutability, an increase in the required down-pay- 
ment ratio is more likely to cause a household to postpone and reduce the 
size of a housing purchase, rather than have to reduce consumption early 
in the life cycle. 
The six-period formulation is also rather arbitrary and allows the con- 
sideration of only large discrete changes in the lifetime tenure pattern. A 
model with more peirods would be able to treat the more continuous 
adjustment of tenure patterns in response to a change in the economic 
environment. The cost of implementing such a model is, of course, the 
increased computational expense. 
Finally, an improved model would more carefully treat the bequest 
motive and, in general, transactions between generations. Differences in 
these transactions between the United States and Japan potentially play a 
large role in the determination of housing decisions and saving decisions 
as well as in the effect of tax policy and other institutional arrangements 
on these decisions. 
In spite of these qualifications, we believe that this analysis represents a 
valuable contribution to the quantitative analysis of the interaction of 
housing market institutions, tax policy, and saving behavior in the United 
States and Japan. It has demonstrated the importance of treating demand 
for housing and saving behavior simultaneously within the context of a 
dynamic model. 
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